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State Criminal Justice and the Challenge of 
Ex-Offender Mobility 
 
 
Wayne A. Logan∗ 
 
In Connectedness and Its Discontents,1 Dan Markel pays me the distinct 
honor of critiquing my recent article, Horizontal Federalism in an Age of Criminal 
Justice Interconnectedness.2  There, I examined the challenges faced by states as 
they seek to apply their registration and recidivist enhancement laws to ex-
offenders who, having discharged their penal commitments, migrate to other states.  
As I explained in Interconnectedness, states employ either an “internal” or 
“external” approach in seeking continued accountability of such individuals, with a 
variety of advantages and disadvantages accruing under each regime.  
In the preceding pages, Professor Markel, while not “convinced that the 
external approach is the obviously superior [approach],” takes me to task for 
having purportedly overestimated its deficiencies.3  Unfortunately, while stated 
with great eloquence, Professor Markel’s assertions are off the mark.  In the brief 
space available here I will try to address each of his arguments and concerns.  
 
I. HARSHNESS 
 
Professor Markel first disputes that the external approach, compared to its 
internal approach counterpart, is “unduly harsh.” As he acknowledges, in 
Interconnectedness I note that émigré offenders subject to the internal approach 
very often experience harsher outcomes than they would under the external 
approach.4  Focusing, however, on the reality that the external approach imports 
what he calls “weird” normative positions of foreign states (e.g., tying registration 
to “peeping” convictions or enhancing sentences based on low-level drug 
convictions), Markel counters that “widen[ing] the scope of penality is not always 
bad.”5 Citing laws codifying what he calls “progressive sensibilities,” such as those 
outlawing martial rape and enhancing sentences for bias-motivated crimes,6 he 
                                                                                                                            
∗   Gary and Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. 
1   Dan Markel, Connectedness and Its Discontents: The Difficulties of Federalism and 
Criminal Law, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573 (2007). 
2   Wayne A. Logan, Horizontal Federalism in an Age of Criminal Justice Interconnectedness, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 257 (2005) [hereinafter Interconnectedness].   
3   Markel, supra note 1, at 575. 
4   See, e.g., Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 272–75.  
5   Markel, supra note 1, at 577. 
6   Id.  
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makes the easy case that states can serve as laboratories of legal pluralism.7  
Interconnectedness, however, does not dispute this commonplace of federalism, 
with its uneven bag of normative results.8  Indeed, as discussed below, a principal 
shortcoming of the external approach is that it disavows and mutes pluralism and 
the democratic processes from which it derives.9      
Professor Markel is thus correct that application of the external approach can 
cut both ways: what one might consider progressive and/or retrograde norms are 
potentially imported.  However, this misses the two larger points made in 
Interconnectedness.  First, that the external approach has a distinctly un-
Brandeisian consequence: rather than allowing individual “experiments” to be 
undertaken in isolation, “without risk to the rest of the country,”10 it reflexively 
imports them (without individualized consideration of their normative merits) to 
drive outcomes in the forum state.11  The second point is that the external 
approach, by applying both its own registration and enhancement criteria and those 
of other states, ineluctably results in an expansion of governmental social control.12  
A harshening does indeed thus occur, and should prompt concern, but not 
necessarily for the individualized instances Markel discusses.  With adoption of the 
external approach, a cumulative legal endoskeleton takes shape in the forum as 
foreign state norms, whether “weird” or not,13 are imported en masse.14  Moreover, 
as I discuss in Interconnectedness, this aggregate is temporally and geographically 
                                                                                                                            
7   See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
8   See Lynn A. Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 433, 448 (2002) 
(“The freedom of sub-national political communities to choose their own visions of the good society, 
like any other form of ‘diversity,’ predictably results in a mixed bag of results.”). 
9   See infra notes 24–30 and accompanying text.  
10  New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, 
at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (identifying as a central benefit of federalism its 
capacity to allow extreme state policies to remain cabined in their place of origin).   
11  To Professor Markel, the external approach promotes intra-state experimentation because a 
state will at once employ foreign and indigenous norms, allowing for comparative analysis.  The 
point is a fair and perceptive one; however, for reasons discussed below, a variety of compelling 
reasons support the view that the internal approach, which assesses the impact of prior misconduct 
through the forum state’s own normative lens, is preferable.   
12  In a footnote, Markel suggests that the external approach might permit states—wishing to 
discourage “unwanted [ex-offender] migration”—to waive application of the forum’s law and single 
out newcomers for differential treatment, thereby avoiding legislative changes in the forum that 
would increase sanctions for newcomer and indigenous populations alike.  Markel, supra note 1, at 
579 n.27; see also id. at text accompanying n.36 (arguing similarly).  The possibility, however, again 
ignores democratic pluralism and autonomy considerations, and fails to address broader inequality 
concerns discussed below.   
13  For instance, twenty-eight states require registration of individuals convicted of the strict 
liability crime of statutory rape.  See Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability 
in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. REV. 295, 325 (2006). 
14  This aggregate is at once akin to, and builds upon, that which occurs when Congress 
criminalizes conduct that states do not.  Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 327 n.371. 
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contingent, indiscriminately importing aspects of substantive criminal law, penal 
norms, and procedures across time and space.15 
 
II. DISPARITY 
 
Professor Markel next disputes my contention that the external approach 
creates troublesome disparities vis-à-vis both émigrés from foreign states and 
émigrés and individuals indigenous to the forum.  He does not deny that the 
external approach creates such disparities but rather asserts that they are not in 
themselves problematic, advancing two arguments in support.16  First, Professor 
Markel maintains that émigrés in an external approach state are on notice that their 
conviction history from their erstwhile home(s) will have mirror-image effect in 
their new state, thereby dissolving any fairness concern.  Markel is correct, as I 
note in Interconnectedness, that notice is a prime benefit of the external 
approach.17  It should go without saying, however, that advance notice of an 
inequity in no way cures its disparate effect.18 
Professor Markel’s second argument against what he calls the “veneer of 
unfairness”19 is somewhat more persuasive.  To his mind, when émigrés 
experience a comparative disadvantage due to their foreign state conviction 
history, this is justified because “[t]he predicate conduct was perpetrated against 
different sovereigns whose democratic institutions may legitimately issue different 
rules with different consequences.”20  While such a statement is of course 
technically correct, it elides the reality that individuals—in the forum—are 
subjected to distinct legal regimes resulting in different outcomes.  As the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals observed in applying its internal approach 
enhancement law to reject consideration of a foreign juvenile conviction, 
“defendants with similar criminal histories should not receive disparate treatment 
depending on the age of majority of the state in which they committed prior 
offenses.”21   
                                                                                                                            
15  Id. at 307–10.  
16  Markel, supra note 1, at 578.  As I note, the disparities present no basis for actionable equal 
protection challenge as such, but rather create policy concern.  Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 
311–12.    
17  Whereas the internal approach often requires complex inter-state comparative legal 
analysis, the external approach is simple and efficient, reflexively transplanting foreign norms and 
outcomes to the forum.  Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 288. 
18  Cf. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 14.6, 
14.7, 17.4 (3d ed. 1999) (surveying distinctions between substantive and procedural due process).  
19  Markel, supra note 1, at 579–80.  
20  Id. at 579. 
21  State v. Thomas, 374 N.W.2d 586, 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); see also State v. Bush, 9 
P.3d 219, 222 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting external approach in order “to ensure that defendants 
with equivalent prior convictions are treated the same way regardless of whether those prior 
convictions were incurred in Washington or elsewhere.”).  Cf. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 
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Professor Markel’s final assertion on the disparity issue—that the external 
approach “actually serves the cause of equality because it ensures that similarly 
situated defendants convicted in the same jurisdiction endure the same kind of 
consequences regardless if one of the offenders decides to go to another 
jurisdiction”22—is equally without merit.  It is at once under-inclusive in that it 
ignores other subject populations23 and serves to underscore the reality that 
individuals are in fact being subject to a different corpus juris with consequent 
disparity.  
 
III. STATE AUTONOMY 
 
Next, Professor Markel takes issue with yet another chief concern expressed 
in Interconnectedness: that the external approach, by reflexively bootstrapping the 
value judgments of other states, functions to abnegate state autonomy.  To him, 
adoption of the external approach actually amounts to an “expression of [state] 
autonomy, rather than as a denigration of it” because it reflects a crime control 
strategy predicated on inter-state deference and comity.24  Such a view, however, 
again ignores a basic functional reality of the external approach: by adopting en 
masse the registration criteria and penal norms of other sovereigns, external 
approach states surrender their criminal justice authority to others.25  With the 
external approach, foreign norms are permitted to dictate outcomes in the forum, in 
disregard of the forum’s own democratically specified criminal justice norms,26 
                                                                                                                            
(2005) (rejecting consideration of foreign nation conviction to trigger U.S. felon-in-possession law 
due to other nations’ varied substantive laws, punishments and procedural protections).   
22  Markel, supra note 1, at 580.  
23  In particular, the comparative experience of émigrés from different states (not the same 
state) and émigrés and indigenous individuals.  Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 304–05.  
24  Markel, supra note 1, at 580. 
25  See State v. Langlands, 583 S.E.2d 18, 20 n.4 (Ga. 2003) (“A state cannot express its public 
policy more strongly than through its penal code.  When a state defines conduct as criminal and sets 
the punishment for the offender, it is conveying in the clearest possible terms its view of public 
policy.” (quoting State v. Edmondson, 818 P.2d 855, 860–61 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991)); see also State v. 
Clough, 829 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (“The obvious purpose of [an internal approach 
recidivist law] is to preclude the enhancement of a sentence if the conduct which led to a conviction 
in another state has not been judged by our legislature to be so egregious . . . as to justify treating it as 
a felony.”).  
26  As the Alaska Court of Appeals put it, “[t]he effect of a prior criminal conviction . . . on the 
sentencing of an Alaska offender implicates issues of policy that are uniquely Alaskan in character 
and have nothing to do with California law.” Mancini v. State, 904 P.2d 430, 432–33 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1995).  See also People v. Laino, 87 P.3d 27, 37 (Cal. 2004) (“[T]he profile of the shadow that 
conviction casts on later events is the business of the state where those later events occur.”) (citation 
omitted).  
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forsaking what the Supreme Court has referred to as a foremost “prerogative[] of 
sovereignty.”27    
Professor Markel closes his autonomy-related discussion by advancing what 
he sees as two additional justifications for adoption of the external approach.  The 
first is that a state might wish “to see its norms adhered to when its offenders 
migrate to other states.”28  For reasons discussed in Interconnectedness, however, 
scant reason exists to believe that states have any motivation whatsoever to be 
mindful of how ex-offenders/residents fare in other states; they are simply likely to 
be glad that they are “out of their hair.”29  
Second, Professor Markel posits that states might embrace the external 
approach because the internal approach allows states to be “free-riders”—“[t]heir 
laws apply in their own jurisdiction and they also have their laws apply to their 
own former citizens who migrate to external approach states.”30  Markel’s 
reference to free-ridership is oddly inverted, as it figures as a core criticism of the 
external approach itself.  As I noted in my prior article: 
 
By deferring to the laws of other sovereigns, forum state officials 
become free riders: they avoid any possible negative political 
consequences that might attend enforcement of such laws in the first 
instance in the forum…The external approach thus permits jurisdictions 
to indulge in a kind of stealth legislation: laws are applied by the forum 
without having been subject to the debate and compromise common to 
the legislative process, depriving the public of an important occasion for 
norm identification and support.  While it might be the case that the 
imported value judgment parallels that of the forum, this is not 
necessarily so, and the stealth quality of the approach undercuts the 
consensus-based (or at least majority-approved) value choices a formal 
law embodies.31 
 
Nor, for similar reasons, do internal approach states engage in what Professor 
Markel refers to as “law hoarding” as a result of having their laws apply in external 
approach states.  As noted above, and as Interconnectedness makes clear, hoarding 
is actually a hallmark of the external approach: states augment their registration 
and enhancement criteria by bootstrapping the laws of other states. 
                                                                                                                            
27  Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985) (“Foremost among the prerogatives of 
sovereignty is the power to create and enforce a criminal code.”).  Cf. Lynn Baker & Ernest Young, 
Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 134 (2001) (extolling the 
“negative freedom” of federalism—the right to act autonomously, free of the constraining authority 
of other governmental units).   
28  Markel, supra note 1, at 580–81.  
29  Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 332. 
30  Markel, supra note 1, at 581. 
31  Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 322–23. 
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IV. DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM AND 
JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION 
 
Professor Markel’s final contention is that the external approach best serves 
the values of experimentalism and diversity ideally associated with federalism.  In 
support, he dwells on a point I acknowledge in Interconnectedness—that the 
deferential quality of the external approach serves to validate and reify other states’ 
norms.32  However, as I make clear, this is only part of the story.  For just as 
adoption of the external approach only superficially serves state autonomy,33 it 
does not qualify as a substitute for actual democratic deliberation within the forum 
on the particular norm in question.34  External approach states, rather than insisting 
that their policies reflect individually legislated sovereign norms, merely “mimic 
the value judgments of other states,”35 and thus undermine governmental 
transparency and political accountability by making it “difficult to ascribe value 
judgments with geo-political accuracy.”36  Nor is the concern mitigated in any 
principled way by Professor Markel’s assertion that the “proportion of migrant 
offenders is likely to be small compared to the number of indigenous offenders.”37  
Even if his empirical assessment is correct,38 transparency and accountability 
remain undercut, as legislators in external approach states shirk their sovereign 
democratic obligations. 
Professor Markel next mistakenly asserts that the external approach does not 
dampen exit rights and offers that “Logan thinks people should be able to commit 
an offense and then escape (some of) the consequences of that conduct by moving 
                                                                                                                            
32  Id. at 320. 
33  See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.  
34  See Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 319–21; see also Ernest Young, The Rehnquist 
Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 52 (2004) (“[S]tate governments cannot provide fora 
for political participation and competition unless meaningful decisions are being made in those 
fora.”). 
35  Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 321. 
36  Id. at 322.  
37  Markel, supra note 1, at 581–82.  
38  There is some question whether this is so.  From March 1999–March 2000, for instance, 
some eight million individuals in the U.S. general population changed state residences.  See U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY RATES, BY TYPE OF MOVEMENT, 1947–2005 tbl. 
A-1 (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/migration/tab-a-1.pdf.  The 
number of ex-offenders changing state residences is not currently known.  However, it is 
conservatively estimated that over a quarter of a million individuals subject to ongoing probation or 
parole conditions live in states other than where their predicate conviction occurred, and hence 
remain subject to the Interstate Compact on Adult Offender Supervision.  See Interstate Commission 
for Adult Offender Supervision, FAQ (March 8, 2007), at http://www.interstatecompact.org/about/ 
faq/default.shtml.  Given the transience of ex-offenders more generally, the number of individuals 
“off paper” is likely quite high.     
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to an ‘easier’ place to live.”39 My article, however, plainly fails to support such an 
inference.  As I wrote, states are surely within their rights to hold migratory 
offenders accountable for their past wrongs;40 the question addressed in 
Interconnectedness is how this should occur: whether by means of express 
sovereign decision or blind deference to other states’ norms.  
With the external approach, the latter is operative, and norms embodied in 
foreign criminal convictions are permitted to inalterably affect future outcomes, 
creating what I refer to as a “residual legal world,”41 limiting prospects for exit.42  
This concern is most pronounced with registration, where the external approach 
requires that émigrés register in the forum if they were required to do so in their 
erstwhile state residence, even if the forum’s eligibility criteria would not require 
registration for an indigenous offender.  There is no mistaking that this method is 
designed to discourage emigration (i.e., norm-evasion).  However, this is precisely 
the point: a foreign state norm (whether “weird” or not) is permitted to dictate 
potentially life-long registration (and thus very likely community notification as 
well),43 triggering a replicating mass of “no-go” zones for individuals seeking to 
avoid what they see as oppressive registration regimes.44  And, because recidivist 
and registration laws commonly date back many years, individuals become subject 
to a “frozen in amber” effect that defies change and possible melioration by forum 
state laws.45  Thus, more than merely “weird” state laws travel (as if this were not 
                                                                                                                            
39  Markel, supra note 1, at 583.  Professor Markel adds that while persons who have served 
their sentence and discharged their conditions of release should be free to migrate, he questions “by 
what moral rights . . . they merit a free roaming pass prior to their release from the criminal justice 
system.” Id. (emphasis added).  I must confess to being confused over this, given that 
Interconnectedness principally addresses individuals who have served their time and completed their 
community release obligations.  
40  Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 260–61.  
41  Id. at 307.  
42  Id. at 325 (“If prior convictions constitute indelible matters of record, . . . as is the case with 
the external approach, geography is permitted to determine destiny—and individuals with such 
records will naturally be less inclined to move . . . . [B]y in effect making laws more uniform, the 
external approach discourages exit.”). 
43  For discussion of the onerous consequences of registration and notification, see Wayne A. 
Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV. 147, 182–207 (2000).  Moreover, 
because registration is typically tied to other restrictions, for instance limits on where registrants can 
live, they too will apply in the forum state.  See Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and 
Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2006) (discussing registrant residence 
exclusion zones enacted in twenty states and dozens of localities).       
44  See, e.g., State v. Flowers, 92 Ark. App. 337 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005) (importing Louisiana’s 
registration requirement for conviction of commercial solicitation of oral sex between adults).  The 
common tendency of states to publicly identify registrants without specifying their qualifying 
offenses, serving to lump together serious and non-serious offenders, heightens this concern.  See, 
e.g., David Hench, Panel to Consider Adding Details to Sex Offender List, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD 
(Maine), July 23, 2006, at A1.        
45  Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 307–10.  
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enough); a panoply of basic trappings of state penal norms do as well—again 
without any individualized normative discernment in the forum.46    
Moreover, to assert, as Professor Markel does, that the external approach 
imposes no “penalty” on migration, because it functions to “sustain[] the same 
legal regime” as one travels from one state to another,47 misses the essential 
promise of exit.  As Seth Kreimer has argued, “state-by-state variation leaves open 
the possibility to each individual of choosing to avoid repression by leaving the 
repressive jurisdiction.”48 By carrying over a registration requirement, an external 
approach state in effect prices emigration, requiring emigrants to internalize a 
negative cost (one that does not apply to residents).49  
It might be that an individual will change state residences in order to take a 
superior job, despite the specter of having to endure a continued oppressive 
registration requirement, as Professor Markel hypothecates.  However, this does 
not justify his conclusion that the emigrant is “indifferent” to the continued 
oppression.50  Such an economically based, rational-choice view ignores the 
intrinsic value associated with freedom of choice in a decentralized system of 
government such as ours.51  Moreover, the view is oblivious to the reality that for 
some the elimination of a less appealing option can have the opposite effect: they 
will remain in an oppressive polity.  In such situations, opportunity for exit and 
freedom of choice are demonstrably lessened, as is the political signal potentially 
sent to the home state by foot voting.52     
Professor Markel ends by offering that there exists a “quid pro quo among the 
external approach states—one that Logan appears reluctant to acknowledge.”53  In 
                                                                                                                            
46  Markel offers that an external state resident, if troubled by the import of a “weird” law, can 
take comfort in the fact that a similar law from her own state will be exported to other external 
approach states.  Markel, supra note 1, at 583.  Aside from focusing wrongly on the general citizenry 
(not emigrant ex-offenders), such a tit-for-tat dynamic highlights the reality that the external 
approach reflexively enshrines and replicates problematic norms of other states.  Markel also 
reiterates that what he sees as progressive laws also travel.  Id.  However, to the extent this leavening 
occurs, it neither meliorates external approach deference to “weird” individual laws nor responds to 
the many doctrinal concerns addressed above.  
47  Markel, supra note 1, at 582.  
48  Seth Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, 71 
(2001). 
49  Cf. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984).   
50  Markel, supra note 1, at 582.  
51  Cf. Cynthia Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 
N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1385 (1998) (asserting that the “law-as-price” view of economic efficiency 
“distill[s] all that is important about law and political obligation into economic terms” and 
“evaporate[es] the moral component of law”); id. (observing that “[l]aw in a democracy is more than 
a price tag.”).  
52  See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE 
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).   
53  Markel, supra note 1, at 584. 
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fact, I acknowledge no such Golden Rule of reciprocity because none exists.  
States adopting the external approach show no evidence of having consulted one 
another in their choice, and the exclusivity of the club is regularly violated when 
an external approach state is compelled to adopt the distinct norm of an internal 
approach state.54  Moreover, it is not unusual for a given state to adopt the external 
approach for registration and the internal approach for recidivist enhancement (or 
vice versa),55 further belying existence of reciprocity.  Nor, finally, does Professor 
Markel’s espoused safety valve for self-replicating oppressive state norms—
federal constitutional litigation56—hold realistic promise.  The Supreme Court has 
long made clear its reluctance to impose constitutional limits on state substantive 
criminal law norms57 and policies,58 including sex offender registration provisions 
in particular.59 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In concluding his critique, Professor Markel offers that the concerns I raise in 
Interconnectedness possibly derive from a “skittishness” over the democratic 
process vis-à-vis criminal law-making and the “purported crisis of 
overcriminalization produced therefrom.”60 Here, he is substantially correct in his 
assessment.  However, in the final analysis, despite what may be taken as my 
undue pessimism, Interconnectedness makes clear that it is the actual exercise of 
democratic decision making (demonstrably absent from the external approach) that 
is the modus operandi of choice as the nation grapples with the ongoing challenges 
posed by emigrant ex-offenders. 
                                                                                                                            
54  Professor Markel observes that external approach states “worried about the injustices 
potentially worked by replicating weird laws of other states” can specify that such laws will not be 
considered.  Id. at 584.  Colorado’s external approach recidivist law and California’s external 
approach registration law do just that, for foreign drug convictions and several specified less serious 
sex offenses (e.g., indecent exposure), respectively.  Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at at 276 n.92, 
287 n.154.  While certainly preferable to the paradigmatic external approach, such offense-specific 
efforts can never capture the great diversity of state laws implicated, and altogether fail to shield 
against the vast array of other factors causing concern (e.g., sentencing and procedural variations).  
55  Compare, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 775.084(1)(e) (2003) (internal approach recidivist law) with 
FLA. STAT. § 943.0435(1)(a)(2) (2003) (external approach registration law).  
56  Markel, supra note 1, at 584. 
57  See Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55 
HASTINGS L.J. 509, 509 (2004) (noting that it “has become a commonplace that there are no 
meaningful constraints on [state] criminal substantive criminal law.”).   
58  See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003) (acknowledging the Court’s 
reluctance to sit as a “‘superlegislature’” and “second-guess” state criminal justice policy choices).    
59  See, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003) (rejecting due process 
challenge to state registration and community notification regime).  
60  Markel, supra note 1, at 584.  
